CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL
and fundamental right to a speedy trial in criminal cases'
is guaranteed by the federal' and most state constitutions.3 Denial of
this right generally entites the defendant to a dismissal of the indictment.4 However, under the majority rule, the defendant must demand
trial or he is deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial.5 A
recent Georgia case, Josey v. State,6 illustrates the potential harshness
of this rule.
In 1943, Josey was indicted but was neither arrested nor informed
of the charges; no effort was made to prosecute him. In 196o, he moved
for a dismissal instead of demanding a trial under the statutory procedure.' The motion was denied, and on appeal Josey contended that
he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial under state and federal
law. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that Josey had neither followed the statutory requirements" for obtaining a speedy trial nor shown any injury from the pendTHE ANCIENT

1 The right to a speedy trial was probably first codified in the Magna Charta, cl. 40:
"To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." See

McKECHNIF, MAGNA CHARTA 395 (2d

ed. 1914).

2 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
' Only six states, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, and
North Carolina, do not have express constitutional guarantees to speedy trial. See
Annot., 129 A.L.R. 57z (940) ; Annot., 57 A.L.R.zd 3o2 (1958). Bit see, Comment,
5 STAN. L. REv. 95 (1952).

'E.g., Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd Per curiam, 350 U.S.
857 (1955) ; State v. Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.zd 965 (1932); Ex parte Mill, 66
Colo. z61, 18o Pac. 749 (i9i9)5 Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 3oz N.E.zd z03
(i95i) 5 State v. Chadwick, 15o Ore. 645, 47 P.zd 232 (1935) ; State v. Keefe, 17
Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122 (i9o8).
See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 363 F.zd 974 (8th Cir. 3947); Meadowcroft
v. People, 363 Ill. 56, 45 N.E. 993 (i896)5 State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 57
N.E.2d 193 (1944) 5 People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 6o (1933) ; State v.
McTague, 373 Minn. 153, z6 N.W. 787 (39z7) 5 State v. Sawyer, z63 Wis. zi, 56
N.W.zd 811 (953); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 380

(1947).
ioz Ga. 707, 17 S.E.zd 643 (396o).
'Ga. Code § 27-1901 (1933)"Any person against whom a true bill of indictment is found for an offense not
affecting his life may demand at either the term when the indictment is found, or at
the next succeeding regular term thereafter, a trial; or, by special permission of the
court, he may at any subsequent term thereafter demand a trial. In either case the
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ing indictment. As the finding of an indictment tolled the statute of
limitations,9 Josey could be tried at any time thereafter because of his
failure to demand a speedy trial. The practical result of the Josey
decision is that the defendant must either allow the indictment to remain pending or demand the very thing he wishes to avoid-the hazard
of a trial instituted on a stale indictment.
From the terms of the statute,' ° it would appear that the Georgia
legislature did not intend such a result, but rather enacted the law to
insure speedy trials of defendants who are arrested and confined or
released on bail. Such a statute should not be taken to limit a defendant's constitutional rights, but merely to delineate the proper procedure
in certain instances." Moreover, the pending indictment significantly
injures the defendant because of attendant anxiety, public suspicion, and
police surveillance.
The minority rule does not require that the defendant demand a
demand for trial shall be placed upon the minutes of the court. If such person shall
not be tried when the demand is made, or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter,
provided at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be
absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment." GA.
CODE § 27-1901

(x933).

This statute now also includes defendants charged with crimes punishable by death.
GA. CODE § 27-1901.1

933).

Whether a defendant may demand a trial after two terms of court lies within the
discretion of the trial court. The Court of Appeals suggested in the principal case
that abuse of this discretion may constitute a denial of the right to a speedy trial, x17
S.E.zd at 643.
'GA. CODE § 27-6o

(1933) . Most states have similar statutes of limitations for

criminal proceedings. Under these statutes, the period of limitation pertains to the
finding of an indictment rather than the time of trial.
See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ Boo,
8oi N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §§ 142, 1445 WIS. STAT. § 939.74 (957).
'0 1... Ifsuch person shall not be tried when the demand ismade, or at the next
succeeding regular term thereafter, provided at both terms there were juries impaneled
and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense
charged in the indictment."

GA.CODE § 27-1901 (1933)

(emphasis added).

" In Alabama, a "demand" jurisdiction which has some statutory material dealing
with the right to a speedy trial,
the supreme court stated in a case where an indictment
had been pending for twelve years: "Although there may be such legislation, the party
indicted is entitled to a speedy trial and the failure to accord it will give occasion for
just complaint on his part." Ex pane State ex rel. Att'y. Gen., 255 Ala. 443, 446, 52
So. 2d 158, 16o (.95.).

Cf. People v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 391, 171 N.E.2d 31o (196o).

There a New York

statute providing for reindictment after dismissal was held subservient to the right to
a speedy trial--a right which is not an express constitutional guarantee in that state.
The court said: "[T]his group of statutes must not be so read as to defeat the fundamental right of an accused citizen to be brought to trial ...
8"N.Y.2d at 39-,
171 N.E.2d at 3z.
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trial. If the state unreasonably delays in bringing the defendant to
trial, the court will grant his motion to dismiss.' This rule prevents
the harsh results possible under "demand" statutes and still requires
the defendant to show an invasion of his right to a speedy trial."3
In both majority and minority rule jurisdictions the prosecution may
voluntarily dismiss the action before the period in which the defendant
must be tried or discharged has elapsed. 4 The defendant then may not
complain of the lack of a speedy trial, because he is no longer charged
with any crime. However, the grand jury may revive the period within
which trial must be granted by finding a new indictment.' 5 Thus, prosecutors may harass "potential defendants" by forcing repeated preparation for defense.'
It is possible to maintain this procedure until the
statute of limitations has run.17
A variant of this dilemma occurs when the defendant is tried under
a new indictment after a dismissal due to denial of a speedy trial. By
1"

In five states the right to a speedy trial is not waived by failure to demand a trial.

State v. Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965 (1932) ; Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175,
o
102 N.E.2d 203 ('95i); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 13 N.E.zd 891 (1955);
Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (x94.5); Ex parte Chalfant,
Si W.Va. 93, 93 S.E. 1032 (1917).
Oklahoma requires a demand by the defendant for trial if he is at large or on bail
or bond. Hutson v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 61, 112 P.2d 11o9 (194i). However, the
burden of bringing speedy trial is on the state if the defendant is in jail. Brummit v.
Higgins, 8o Okla. Crim. 183, 157 P.2d 9zz (1945).
" In addition to the constitutional provisions for the right to a speedy trial, fortytwo states have implementing statutes. In order to show a denial of his rights, a defendant merely needs to prove that he was not tried within the statutory period. See,
e.g., State v. Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965 (1932) ; Flanary v. Commonwealth,
184 Va. 204, 35 S.E.2d 135 (1945).
" The voluntary dismissal, or volle prosequi, is allowed by statute in most states.
See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-9io (1956) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 6z-1437 (1949) ;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 89, §117 (1954") 5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-175 (195i) ; WIS.

STAT. § 955.17(2)
cedure.

(1957).

Some states, however, have expressly abolished this pro-

See, e.g., ALASKA COMP. LAWs ANN. § 66-8-I7 (1949);

CAL. PEN. CODE

§

1386.
"E.g., People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal. 2d 677, 140 P.2d 381 (194-3); State v. Rowland, 17z Kan. 224, 239 P.2d 949 (1952); State v. McGowan, 113 Mont. 591 , 131
P.zd 26z (1942); Mealy v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 26, 68 S.E.zd 507 (1952).
Contra, Brown v. State, 85 Ga. 7Y3, ii S.E. 831 (189o) ; People ex rel. Nagel v.
Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 8o N.E. z91 (1907); State v. Crawford, 83 W.Va. 556, 98 S.E.

61S (1919).
In some states a dismissal automatically bars reindictment by express statutory provision. See, e.g., ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 66-i8-i8 (1949) (for misdemeanors
only) ; GA. CODE § 27-1901 (933)" See Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. io6 (D.C. Cal. 194o) ; Comment, 5 STAN. L.
REV. 95, 96-99 (.952).
" See note 9, supra.
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the majority view, reindictment under such circumstances is permissible.: 8 However, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Wilson, 9 recently held that the second trial was a denial of both the right
to a speedy trial and due process of law." The majority opinion pointed
out that trial on a new indictment for the same crime after a dismissal
for denial of a speedy trial would, in effect, make the right illusory."
The length of time that had elapsed between the first and second indictments was an important factor in the decision; 22 the court recognized
that a defendant might not be entitled to have the second indictment
dismissed if the delay were not so great.23
These recent decisions reflect divergent policies toward the right to
a speedy trial. The basis of the majority rule is a fear that burdening
the state with the duty of bringing about a speedy trial might turn the
constitutional safeguard into a technical rule, freeing defendants who
were never really injured. 4 This apprehension is unjustified. Even if
this burden were on the state, the defendant could waive the right by
consenting to a continuance 25 or by obstructive20 or dilatory2 7 tactics.
" See cases cited note 15, supra.
108 N.Y.zd 391, 171 N.E.zd 310 (196o).
208 N.Y.zd at 39-, 171 N.E.2d at 32.
There is also dictum to the effect that

a flagrant denial by a state of the right to a speedy trial would amount to a denial of
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. In re Sawyer's Petition, 229
F.2d 8o5 ( 7 th Cir. t956).
21

171 N.E.2d at 33

The dissent asserted that the legislature intended the statute

of limitations, not the right to a speedy trial, to determine when indictments could be
found. Id. at 314.
22 Four and one-half years elapsed between the first and second indictments.
171
N.E.2d at 311.
"Id. at 313.
2'See People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 6o (1933); State v. McTague,
173 Minn. 153, 716 N.W. 787 (927).
'People v. Niemoth, 409 Ill. 111, 98 N.E.zd 733, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 858
(x95i); Ex parte Baxter, 121 Kan. 636, 249 Pac. 61o (1926); Glebe v. State, io6
Neb. 251, 183 N.W. 295 (1921); State v. Chadwick, i5o Ore. 645, 47 P.2d 232
(1935).
In some jurisdictions this consent may be inferred from failure to object to a continuance granted at the request of the prosecution. People v. Hocking, 140 Cal. App. 2d
778, 296 P.2d 59 (1956) ; Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, 71 A.2d 36 (ig5o). Other
states require express consent in order to constitute a waiver. Nicolay v. Kill, 16x Kan.
667, 170 P.2d 823 (946).
2 Ex parte Morgan, 57 N.D. 763, 224 N.W. 209 (1929) (procuring absence of
witnesses) ; Hart v. United States, 183 Fed. 368 (6th Cir. 191o), cert. denied, 220 U.S.
6o9 (i911) (failure to appear).
27
Dilatory pleadings and motions are usually held to be waivers of the right to a
speedy trial. In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 8o5 (Tth Cir. 1956); People v.
Clemente, 8 N.Y.2d 1, 167 N.E.2d 327 (196o).
Where such motions do not in fact
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The purposes underlying the constitutional guarantee should determine where the burden of bringing about speedy trial should lie. The
right is intended to prevent long imprisonment before trial, relieve the
apprehension that accompanies untried charges, and avoid subjection to
the danger of a trial after a long period of time."' The minority rule,
in placing the burden on the state to speedily bring the case to trial,
eliminates prosecution under old indictments. The pholsophy implicit
in the rule also promotes decisions such as the Wilson case, preventing
prejudicial reindictment after dismissal.2 9 In addition, placing the burden on the prosecution to try the defendant within a reasonable time
comports with the traditional presumption of innocence, which requires
the prosecution to prove each element of the crime charged3 0 The
minority rule best serves the purposes of the speedy trial requirement
and insures the preservation of this fundamental right.
cause delay, however, they do not constitute waivers.

In re Mill, 66 Colo. 261, i8o

Pac. 749 (1919).
58

"We can conceive the anarchy which would result if the power to terminate a

criminal proceeding for want of prosecution did not exist. Defendants might have
prosecutions hang over their heads, like the sword of Damocles, for years, without an
effort being made to bring them to trial." Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. io6, sos
(S.D. Cal. 1940). See People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 13o N.E.2d 891 (1955).
2" State v. Crawford, 83 W.Va. 556, 98 S.E. 61S (i919).
Some demand jurisdictions have reached the same result. See Brown v. State, 85 Ga. 713, Yi S.E. 831 (.896) 5
People ex rel. Nagel v. Heider, 225 I1. 347, 8o N.E. 291 (:907).

Most jurisdictions, however, allow reindictment after dismissal for denial of a
speedy trial. See cases cited note iS,supra.

s09

WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2511 (1940).

